maligned predecessor of the Tydings-McDuffie Law be brought to life and that the Philippine Legislature be afforded another and last opportunity to accept the law. In the second place, the two missions had the satisfaction of having driven a hard bargain with Uncle Sam. In the third place, military reservations scattered over the Islands totalling about three hundred thousand acres were to cease to exist when the day for independence arrived. The last was really a concession which the administration could offer without injury to anyone, for I happen to know that the joint Army and Navy Board in Washington never intended to retain military reservations in the Philippines after independence had come.

Most important of all, the Congressional Act represented a successful effort at all-around pacification. The law underwrote a many-sided, face-saving compromise. For the United States it sought to quiet agitation against Philippine products and to avoid stirring up quarrelsome issues. For the Philippines it sought to secure endorsement by the opposing camps. The *Pros* could proclaim that they had succeeded in gaining the approval of the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act with insignificant changes. The *Anus* could boast that they had succeeded in getting Congress to reconsider the Act, to clarify ambiguities and to remove uncertainties, and in having the President promise that future petitions would be seriously considered.

So all were satisfied and face was saved. With good reason could Senator Vandenberg for the Republicans

taunt the Democrats and their allies that yesterday's anathema, referring to the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act, had become the Tydings-McDufEe benediction.

The Tydings-McDufHe Law was complemented by other Congressional measures of about the same period which affected American-Philippine relations. Under the Jones-Costigan Act, the Philippines was allotted a quota of approximately one million short tons of centrifugal sugar and ap-